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This paper analyses the methods of the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC) for evaluating the carcinogenicity of various agents. I identify two fundamental
evidential principles that underpin these methods, which I call Evidential Proximity
and Independence. I then show, by considering the 2018 evaluation of the carcinoge-
nicity of styrene and styrene‐7,8‐oxide, that these principles have been implemented
in a way that can lead to inconsistency. I suggest a way to resolve this problem: admit
a general exception to Independence and treat the implementation of Evidential
Proximity more flexibly where this exception applies. I show that this suggestion is
compatible with the general principles laid down in the 2019 version of IARC's
methods guide, its Preamble to the Monographs.
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The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is the World
Health Organization body responsible for evaluating the carcinogenic-
ity of environmental and occupational exposures. These include a
wide range of individual chemicals, as well as mixtures such as welding
fumes and behavioural factors such as shift work. Since the start of
the programme in 1970, over a thousand such agents have been eval-
uated, many of them more than once due to new evidence becoming
available.
IARC is interesting from the point of view of the methodology of
evidence evaluation because it is one of the few organizations that
systematically evaluates a very broad evidence base—including epide-
miological studies on humans, (nonhuman) animal studies, and mecha-
nistic studies—and it has developed an explicit recipe for integrating
the results of the evaluation of each sort of study. Clarke et al1 argue
that there is a tendency elsewhere in biomedicine, propagated by the
evidence‐based medicine movement, to focus in the final assessment- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Creative Commons Attribution Li
cal Practice Published by John Wiof causation almost exclusively on statistical studies on humans and
to disregard or downplay other sorts of study and that this tendency
is problematic. IARC is notable for not succumbing to this tendency.
In Section 2, I analyse IARC's evaluation procedures and argue that
they conform to the following two general evidential principles:
Evidential Proximity: Studies on populations closer to the popula-
tion of interest carry more weight than studies on more remote popu-
lations, ceteris paribus.
Independence: Each agent is assessed solely on the basis of evi-
dence specific to that agent.
While these epistemological principles are well motivated, I shall
show in Section 3 with reference to the 2018 evaluations of styrene
and styrene‐7,8‐oxide that the way they are currently implemented
in IARC procedure can in principle lead to inconsistent assessments
of carcinogenicity. In Section 4, I propose improvements to the proce-
dure that would avoid this source of error. Finally, in Section 5, I show- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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2 WILLIAMSONthat these suggestions are compatible with IARC's new (2019) articu-
lation of its general principles for evaluating carcinogenicity.2 Thus,
the proposal is for changes to the implementation of the general prin-
ciples rather than to the general principles themselves.*FIGURE 1 Evidential relationships for evaluating a causal claim32 | EVIDENTIAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING
IARC's METHODS
IARC's goal is to determine whether the agent in question is a cause of
cancer and the sites within the body where cancers occur, not the
extent to which the agent causes cancer. This is called determining
“cancer hazard” rather than “cancer risk.” The rationale for this focus
is that exposure to the agent in question varies geographically and
over time, and so cancer risk varies. It is left up to individual govern-
ments to determine whether to restrict an agent whose carcinogenic-
ity is established or likely. This decision typically depends not only on
cancer hazard but also on the assessment of local risk, the impact on
local businesses and, alas, the influence of industries that sell or prop-
agate the agent in question.
IARC is interesting from the point of view of the methodology of
evidence evaluation because it is one of the few organizations that
has a detailed procedure for systematically evaluating mechanistic
evidence.
Clarke et al [1, Section1] argue that in recent decades, there has been
a widespread tendency in biomedicine—promoted by the evidence‐
basedmedicinemovement—to focus on evaluating clinical and epidemi-
ological studies and to disregard or downplay other sources of evidence,
such as expert opinion, basic science, and mechanistic studies. A clinical
or epidemiological study for the claim that A is a cause of B in a target
population of interest measures the incidence of A and B in populations
close to the target population, together with possible confounding fac-
tors that might explain away an observed correlation between A and B.
When evaluating medicines, randomized studies are common. In the
assessment of environmental and occupational exposures, however, it
is normally only feasible to conduct observational studies on populations
close to the target population, for ethical reasons; experimental studies
remain ethically permissible in populations involving animal models,
which are somewhat remote from the target human population. Clinical
and epidemiological studies help to determine whether A causes B, not
how A causes B. Mechanistic studies, in contrast, seek to elucidate fea-
tures of the mechanism by which A might cause B.
The tendency to disregard or downplay mechanistic studies may
be attributable to the fallacious inference that mechanistic studies
help to determine how, not whether, A causes B. In fact, mechanistic
studies can be crucial to the evaluation of whether A causes B.
Figure 1, from Williamson,3 provides a conceptualization of the prob-
lem that explains why this is the case. As is well recognized, correla-
tion is insufficient for causation. What distinguishes a causal
connection from other explanations of a correlation, such as con-
founding, bias or chance, is the existence of a mechanism linking A*I should emphasize that the focus of this paper is on methodology; I do not criticize any par-
ticular past assessment of carcinogenicity.to B, which explains instances of B in terms of A and which can
account for the extent of the observed correlation. Accordingly, to
establish that A is a cause of B, one needs to establish not only that
A is correlated with B but also that there exists some mechanism of
action.4 Clinical or epidemiological studies are the primary means of
confirming a correlation in biomedicine; this channel of confirmation
is labelled C1 in Figure 1. Clinical and epidemiological studies can also,
in the right circumstances, establish the existence of a mechanism (C2):
If sufficiently many studies consistently observe a large enough corre-
lation and their study designs are of sufficiently high quality, then one
may be able to rule out noncausal explanations of the correlation, such
as confounding, bias, and chance, and infer that there must be some
mechanism that gives rise to the correlation, even if the details of
the mechanism remain unknown. However, another way to confirm
the existence of a mechanism of action involves finding key features
of that mechanism (M2), and these features are in turn confirmed by
mechanistic studies (M1). In addition, features of the mechanism can
also confirm the existence of a correlation (M3). However, clinical
and epidemiological studies, where they exist, are usually more infor-
mative in this regard.
Returning to the evaluation of carcinogenicity, epidemiological
studies often fail on their own to provide conclusive evidence of car-
cinogenicity along the C channels. This leaves room for mechanistic
studies to influence the overall evaluation along the M channels. In
several cases, IARC's preliminary evaluation of carcinogenicity, formed
on the basis of human and animal studies, has been upgraded by con-
firmatory evidence from mechanistic studies—this happened in the
case of benzo[a]pyrene, for example.5 In other cases, the preliminary
evaluation of carcinogenicity has been downgraded by disconfirming
evidence from mechanistic studies—this happened in the case of
d‐limonene, for example.6
IARC's procedure is constantly evolving. The “Preamble” to IARC's
monographs on carcinogenicity encodes the general principles of its
procedure, but long periods pass between revisions of this document,
and the way in which the general principles are implemented can
change more rapidly. IARC7 recorded the general principles as of
2006, and this version of the Preamble was in use until 2019, when
WILLIAMSON 3revisions were captured in a new version of the Preamble.2 This paper
is particularly concerned with some agents evaluated in 2018, and the
methods in use at that evaluation can be summarized as follows. First,
assessments of human and animal studies are used to form a prelimi-
nary evaluation of carcinogenicity. Figure 2 explains this evaluation.
Carcinogenicity is evaluated on the following scale: 1 (the agent is car-
cinogenic to humans), 2A (it is probably carcinogenic to humans), 2B (it
is possibly carcinogenic to humans), 3 (it is not classifiable as to its car-
cinogenicity to humans), and 4 (it is probably not carcinogenic to
humans). Human and animal studies are assessed on the following
scale: sufficient (causation is established), limited (minor limitations
to the evidence), inadequate (major limitations to the evidence), and
ESLC (evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenicity). For instance, inad-
equate studies in humans and sufficient studies in animals would yield
a preliminary rating of possibly carcinogenic, 2B. Next, mechanistic
studies are taken into account, and this can lead to the preliminary rat-
ing being upgraded or downgraded, as explained in Figure 3. The
mechanistic studies are rated as strong, moderate, or weak according
to how strongly they confirm 10 standard specific mechanistic
hypotheses, called the “ten key characteristics of carcinogens”,8 eg,FIGURE 2 The International Agency for
Research on Cancer's (IARC's) use of human
and animal studies, as of 2018 (http://
monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Publications/
Evaluations.pdf)
FIGURE 3 The International Agency for
Research on Cancer's (IARC's) use of
mechanistic studies and other considerations
to upgrade and downgrade evaluations, as of
2018 (http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/
Publications/Evaluations.pdf)the hypothesis that the agent is genotoxic or the hypothesis that it
is electrophilic. Then, an assessment is made as to whether a hypoth-
esized mechanism is likely to be operative in humans. If it is, an
upgrade of the preliminary evaluation may be possible—eg, from 2B
to 2A. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the mechanism
does not operate in humans, then a downgrade is possible, as hap-
pened with d‐limonene.
Figures 2 and 3 support the following observations. First, evidence
in humans is treated as more decisive than evidence in animals. Evi-
dence in humans graded as “sufficient” is enough to establish carcino-
genicity, for instance. Second, mechanistic studies have a relatively
minor influence. For example “sufficient” evidence in animals is nor-
mally enough for a 2B rating, but mechanistic evidence on its own,
without any evidence from humans or animals, would not yield any-
thing more than 3 (unclassifiable).
One thing that is not apparent from these tables, but is set out
more clearly in IARC's Preamble and is clear in discussions of the
working group that considers mechanistic studies, is that the mecha-
nistic studies themselves have varying influence. IARC7, p21 notes that
“the strongest indications that a particular mechanism operates in
4 WILLIAMSONhumans derive from data on human or biological specimens obtained
from exposed humans.” In fact, in vivo studies in exposed humans
carry most weight, ceteris paribus, followed by ex vivo studies (where
specimens are extracted from exposed humans for experimentation
and analysis), then in vitro studies on human cells, then in vivo studies
in mammals, with higher weight given to studies involving studies
mechanistically closer to humans, followed by studies on nonmammals
and model organisms, followed by studies involving toxicokinetic and
pharmacokinetic models (which are mathematical models).
Arguably, then, IARC's procedures can be said to conform to the
following evidential principle. When assessing whether a causal claim
holds of a population of interest,
Evidential Proximity. Studies on populations closer to the popula-
tion of interest carry more weight than studies on more remote popu-
lations, ceteris paribus.
IARC is interested in causes of cancer in humans, so the population
of interest is the population of humans. Here, I take it that one popu-
lation is close to another if it is mechanistically close: if the mecha-
nisms that are relevant to the causal claim are similar. Now, two
mechanisms can be said to be similar when key features of the mech-
anisms (ie, key entities, activities, and structural features) are similar
(ie, are similar enough for one to be able to infer that the mechanisms
as a whole have a similar function). The ceteris paribus condition
ensures that high‐quality studies on a more remote population can,
in the right circumstances, have more weight than poor quality studies
on a closer population. One can justify Evidential Proximity by observ-
ing that mechanistic similarity is required to successfully extrapolate a
causal claim from one population to another.9,10 Ceteris paribus,
results of studies are more likely to extrapolate to humans the closer
the mechanisms of action in the study are to those operational in
humans.
A second principle is apparent from IARC's protocol.† With one
kind of exception, discussed below, each agent is assessed on its
own merits:
Independence. Each agent is assessed solely on the basis of evi-
dence specific to that agent.
The evidence specific to an agent includes human and animal stud-
ies that investigate exposure to that agent, as well as mechanistic
studies that shed light on features of mechanisms involving that agent.
The Independence principle ensures that the evidence base relevant
to one agent is evaluated independently of the evaluations of other
agents. A particular study may investigate two agents and may feature
in the evidence base of each agent. However, the two evidence bases
are then evaluated independently: The evidence base for one agent
screens off the evaluation of the other. Independence accords well†As with Evidential Proximity, this principle is not exclusive to IARC. Arguably, the Indepen-
dence principle is embedded in all evaluations made on the basis of systematic review. A
review protocol excludes from consideration studies and evaluations that are not specific to
the causal relationship under investigation.with Evidential Proximity. Studies of the carcinogenicity of other
agents are somewhat remote from the question of whether the agent
under investigation is carcinogenic, because different mechanisms are
likely to operate, so the evaluations of the other agents should not
influence that of the agent in question, given its evidence base. There
is one exception to the Independence principle that is embedded in
IARC procedure. This the case when the agent being evaluated is in
a class of agents that have the same mechanism of carcinogenicity
and some of which have been previously classified as carcinogenic
or probably carcinogenic. In that case, we see in Figure 3 that these
previous evaluations can make a difference: The rating of the agent
can be upgraded from 2B to 2A.3 | A PROBLEM CASE: STYRENE AND
STYRENE‐7,8‐OXIDE
IARC has evaluated the carcinogenicity of styrene and styrene‐7,8‐
oxide three times each, most recently in March 2018.11 The 2018
evaluation of these agents is interesting because it suggests a prob-
lematic case for IARC procedure.
Styrene is a colourless volatile liquid, produced mainly in East Asia
and used in the production of polystyrene and other compounds that
feature in a diverse range of goods, including LEGO blocks, boats, and
wind‐turbine blades. Styrene is inhaled in tobacco smoke, air pollution,
from food packaging materials, and in the manufacturing process. In
the recent evaluation, human evidence was judged limited, but the ani-
mal evidence was deemed sufficient. This combination leads to a pre-
liminary overall classification of 2A (see Figure 2).
Styrene‐7,8‐oxide is a clear liquid and widely produced. It is used in
epoxy resins and in compounds that are key to the production of
many chemicals. Little is known about exposure other than that it is
inhaled in the reinforced plastics industry. In the recent evaluation,
human evidence was judged inadequate, but animal evidence was suf-
ficient. This leads to a preliminary overall classification of 2B (Figure 2).
There were also a large number of mechanistic studies relevant to
the 10 key characteristics of carcinogens that are routinely evaluated
by IARC. As we have seen, these can moderate the overall classifica-
tion by supporting the claim that there is a mechanism of action in
humans. In addition, some mechanistic studies supported a further
mechanistic assertion. It turns out that styrene is readily oxidized to
form styrene‐7,8‐oxide and that, by far the most plausible route of
carcinogenicity proceeds via this oxide (indeed, the mechanisms work-
ing group ruled out the main alternative hypothesis: the hypothesis
that carcinogenicity proceeds via 4‐vinylphenol). The assertion, then,
is this:
(A) Styrene only causes cancer, if it does at all, via the intermediary
styrene‐7,8‐oxide.
Here is the problem. Human and animal evidence led to a prelimi-
nary rating of 2A for styrene and 2B for styrene‐7,8‐oxide. This clas-
ses styrene as probably carcinogenic and styrene‐7,8‐oxide as
WILLIAMSON 5possibly carcinogenic but not probably carcinogenic. However, the
probability of styrene‐7,8‐oxide being carcinogenic must be at least
that of styrene being carcinogenic, given (A). We have a
contradiction.‡4 | PROPOSED RESOLUTION
In order to avoid the possibility of contradiction in this example, one
would want to reason as follows: There is inadequate evidence spe-
cific to styrene‐7,8‐oxide, but (A) holds and there is stronger evidence
specific to styrene of its carcinogenicity, hence the evaluation of
styrene‐7,8‐oxide should be influenced by that of styrene (it should
be raised from 2B to 2A). However, Independence and Evidential
Proximity, as currently implemented, conspire to thwart this inference.
It is primarily Independence that ensures that one cannot upgrade
the evaluation of styrene‐7,8‐oxide in the light of (A) and strong evi-
dence of the carcinogenicity of styrene. This is because the evaluation
of styrene is screened off from that of styrene‐7,8‐oxide by the evi-
dence base specific to styrene‐7,8‐oxide (similarly, one cannot use
the evaluation of styrene‐7,8‐oxide to downgrade the evaluation of
styrene in order to ensure consistency). Note that the one exception
to Independence does not apply here: Styrene and styrene‐7,8‐oxide
are not in a class of structurally similar agents, some of which have
previously been classified as carcinogens—rather, one is an intermedi-
ary along the pathway from the other to carcinogenicity.
It is not even possible for (A) on its own to influence the evaluation
of styrene‐7,8‐oxide, given Independence as currently implemented.
According to current IARC protocol, the influence of mechanistic stud-
ies is mediated by the 10 key characteristics of carcinogens (unless the
mechanistic class hypothesis applies). However, (A) sheds no light on
any pathway from styrene‐7,8‐oxide to cancer, so (A) says nothing
about the 10 key characteristics of carcinogens, insofar as they apply
to styrene‐7,8‐oxide. Thus, not only is the evaluation of styrene
screened off from that of styrene‐7,8‐oxide, assertion (A) itself is
deemed irrelevant to the evaluation of styrene‐7,8‐oxide, on current
IARC procedure.
Furthermore, we saw above that Evidential Proximity yields a strict
hierarchy of mechanistic evidence. Indeed, IARC implements Eviden-
tial Proximity in such a way that for mechanistic studies to be evalu-
ated as providing strong evidence that there is a mechanism
operational in humans, there need to be convincing mechanistic stud-
ies on humans. However, low‐level mechanistic assertions like (A),
dealing with the way in which compounds are metabolized, need
not be established on the basis of (often observational) studies on
humans. Often, experimental studies in the lab are the primary‡The concern here is that inconsistency can arise, not that it did arise in this particular evalu-
ation. While the preliminary overall classification would have led to inconsistency, in the final
evaluation of styrene and styrene‐7.8‐oxide mechanistic studies were deemed in each case to
provide strong evidence for the existence of a mechanism of carcinogenicity in humans. This
made no difference to the preliminary evaluation of styrene, which was 2A, but meant that
styrene‐7,8‐oxide was upgraded from 2B to 2A (cf. Fig. 3). Fortuitously, inconsistency was
avoided in the final evaluation.grounds for such claims—studies that would typically be classed by
IARC as providing weak mechanistic evidence. Thus, IARC's imple-
mentation of Evidential Proximity provides no natural place for evi-
dence in favour of (A) to influence the evaluation of carcinogenicity.
In order to eradicate the potential for inconsistency, one thus
needs to alter the implementation of IARC's procedures. One might
suggest dropping Evidential Proximity or Independence or both. How-
ever, these are both plausible principles, and there is no need to aban-
don either in a wholesale way. A change to the implementation of
each of these principles would remedy the situation.
First, the implementation of Independence must change. The evi-
dence base specific to styrene‐7,8‐oxide included human and animal
studies—which on their own were rather inconclusive—as well as
mechanistic studies that establish assertion (A). Now, (A) itself pro-
vides grounds for looking beyond the evidence base specific to
styrene‐7,8‐oxide: It implies that the evaluation of styrene could be
relevant to that of styrene‐7,8‐oxide. Therefore, the evidence base
specific to styrene‐7,8‐oxide motivates a new exception to
Independence.
One might try to alter Independence, then, by adding another
explicit exception. However, it is far from clear as to how to formu-
late this second exception in a way that is both general enough to be
applicable in further cases yet specific enough as to be plausible. One
might try “if the agent can only cause cancer via a pathway upon
which lies a second agent whose carcinogenicity has been consid-
ered, the classification of the first agent should not exceed that of
the second agent.” But the second agent may have been evaluated
at a time when less evidence was available, in which case the incon-
sistency may reflect this change of evidence and, if so, would be less
troubling than the inconsistency identified above. In this case,
upgrading the rating of the second agent would not be an option
unless the second agent were under consideration for re‐evaluation.
Any explicit formulation of this second exception to Independence
will clearly be rather complicated. Moreover, it is likely that further
exceptions will be needed to deal with similar situations in which
where there are multiple causal pathways to carcinogenicity. The
worry is that this proposal would increase the number of ad hoc
exceptions to a core principle, would be complex, and the list of
exceptions may yet remain incomplete.
The exception to Independence can, however, be pitched at a gen-
eral level:
Independence: Each agent should be assessed solely on the basis of
evidence specific to that agent, unless there is mechanistic evidence
in that evidence base that warrants taking other evaluations into
account.
The advantage of this formulation is that it encompasses the
mechanistic class exception (where the evidence base includes mech-
anistic evidence that the agent is in a class of agents established to
cause cancer in the same way) as well as the mechanistic pathway
exception—eg, assertion (A)—and more complex variants of this excep-
tion. By reformulating Independence in this way, we avoid the need
for a list of concrete exceptions that would appear both ad hoc and
potentially incomplete.
6 WILLIAMSONIn addition, the implementation of Evidential Proximity must also
change. In IARC's methodology as outlined above, mechanistic studies
in humans on the agent in question are required for the mechanistic
evidence to count as “strong” and to warrant a substantial upgrade
in the preliminary evaluation of an agent. This restriction is appropri-
ate in relation to evidence for the key characteristics of carcinogens,
but it is not necessarily appropriate when considering the exceptions
to Independence. That an agent is a member of a mechanistic class
may be established by bench work in the laboratory—studies on
humans or animals may not be required. Similarly, a pathway hypoth-
esis such as (A) may be established by studies other than those carried
out on humans. In sum, nonhuman mechanistic studies may be suffi-
cient to establish specific mechanistic hypotheses other than the 10
key characteristics of carcinogens. The formulation of Evidential Prox-
imity of Section 2 remains intact, but its implementation needs to
depend on the specific mechanistic hypothesis under consideration.
The proposal is, then, that Independence and Evidential Proximity
should be implemented more flexibly. Independence requires a general
exception and, when considering evidence relevant to this exception,
Evidential Proximity should not invariably be taken to require evi-
dence obtained on humans. IARC working groups responsible for the
evaluation of mechanistic studies would be expected to focus on the
10 key characteristics of carcinogens, and on evidence in humans,
unless there is compelling evidence for some other specific mechanis-
tic hypothesis, such as the mechanistic class hypothesis or a mechanis-
tic pathway hypothesis analogous to (A). There will be others, no
doubt. There is no need to formulate every such hypothesis in
advance as an explicit exception. Mechanistic evidence influences
assessments of causation in heterogeneous ways,12 and it suffices that
the mechanistic working group be receptive to new possibilities.FIGURE 4 Evidential relationships for the International Agency for
Research on Cancer's (IARC's) evaluations5 | IARC's REVISED PREAMBLE
Thus far, I have suggested that the problem posed by styrene and
styrene‐7,8‐oxide can be mitigated by increasing the range of specific
mechanism hypotheses that can influence the overall classification of
an agent. This change can be thought of as replacing an ad hoc excep-
tion to the Independence principle by a general exception and by
implementing Evidential Proximity in a more nuanced way. It turns
out that IARC's new Preamble2 leaves some room for this additional
flexibility, as we shall now see.
Perhaps the main innovation in the 2019 Preamble is with regard
to the treatment of mechanistic studies. Mechanistic studies are now
treated on a par with human studies and animal studies, rather than
having a subsidiary role whereby human and animal studies determine
a preliminary classification as per Figure 2, and mechanistic studies can
be used to make small adjustments to the final classification (Figure 3).
This change reflects increasing recognition that, in general, mechanis-
tic evidence should be treated on a par with clinical and epidemiolog-
ical studies when assessing causality (Figure 1).
The Preamble now explicitly acknowledges the centrality of the 10
key characteristics of carcinogens to the evaluation of mechanisticstudies.2, section B.4.b (The Preamble emphasizes that these 10 charac-
teristics are not detailed descriptions of mechanistic pathways from
the agent to cancer but are key features of such pathways that are
indicative of carcinogenicity). Importantly, the 2019 Preamble also
provides room for “evidence that falls outside of the recognized key
characteristics of carcinogens, reflecting emerging knowledge or
important novel scientific developments on carcinogen mechanisms.”2,
p32 While this provision is chiefly intended to allow for revisions to the
list of key characteristics of carcinogens in the period before the next
update of the Preamble, it can also be construed as providing space
for specific mechanism hypotheses other than the key characteristics,
such as assertion (A). Thus, the general exception to Independence,
outlined above, is compatible with the approach to mechanistic stud-
ies set out in the 2019 Preamble. Likewise, although the new Pream-
ble does not explicitly mention specific mechanism hypotheses other
than the 10 characteristics of carcinogens and the mechanistic class
hypothesis, it only requires studies on humans when classifying mech-
anistic evidence for the key characteristics of carcinogens as strong.
This leaves open the possibility that a mechanistic pathway hypothesis
such as (A) can be treated analogously to the mechanistic class
hypothesis. Thus, the recommendations put forward in this paper are
compatible with IARC's general principles as currently formulated.
In the light of Figure 1, the evidential relationships at the core of
IARC's 2019 methodology can be conceptualized by means of
Figure 4. The team responsible for an evaluation encompasses four
working groups, looking at exposure characterization, human studies,
animal studies, and mechanistic studies, respectively. Human studies,
in the light of what is known about exposure, can directly test the
claim that the agent under investigation is correlated with cancer in
humans. If it is, and if there are sufficiently many high quality studies,
and if these studies are sufficiently concordant, they can also confirm
the general mechanistic claim that there exists some mechanism of
carcinogenicity in humans that is responsible for this correlation,
thereby confirming the overall causal claim. Animal studies can also
confirm this correlation claim and general mechanistic claim as long
as it is established that the mechanisms of carcinogenicity in those ani-
mals are sufficiently similar to those in humans. In addition, mechanis-
tic studies test the general mechanistic claim via the key
WILLIAMSON 7characteristics of carcinogens. Crucially, other specific mechanism
hypotheses, such as (A), may also be relevant to the truth of the gen-
eral mechanistic claim, and the proposal is that they should be taken
into account where applicable. Such a hypothesis can motivate moving
beyond the evidence base of the agent under investigation: Thanks to
(A), for example, the evaluation of styrene is relevant to the assess-
ment of styrene‐7,8‐oxide and should influence its overall evaluation.
This requires no change to the overall picture—just a recognition that
“other specific mech. hypotheses” can include hypotheses such as (A)
in addition to the mechanistic class hypothesis.6 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that IARC's procedures conform to two
general principles, Evidential Proximity and Independence. Both of
these principles are plausible, from an epistemological point of view.
Recent work on extrapolation provides support for Evidential Proxim-
ity, and Independence captures the evidentialist precept that studies
relevant to a causal claim should screen off the evaluation of that
claim from other causal judgements.
We saw that the implementation of these general principles needs
some care. The case of styrene and styrene‐7,8‐oxide poses a problem
for the current implementation of IARC's rules for assessing carcinoge-
nicity. This is a problem readily solved, however. Incoherence can be
avoided by formulating a general exception to Independence and
implementing Evidential Proximity more flexibly where this exception
applies.
The points made here readily generalize to other situations in
which causal claims are systematically evaluated. Evidential Proximity
and Independence remain credible when assessing other forms of
exposure and when assessing the effectiveness of interventions. In
any such situation, it is hard to limit in advance the range of specific
mechanism hypotheses that might be relevant. Rather, the pertinent
specific mechanism hypotheses can be expected to vary from causal
claim to causal claim.12, section 5.1
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